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ABSTRACT
With the significant development of mobile commerce, the integra-
tion of physical, social, and cyber worlds is increasingly common.
The term Cyber Physical Social Systems is used to capture tech-
nology’s human-centric role. With the revolutionization of CPSS,
privacy protections become a major concern for both customers
and enterprises. Although data generalization by obfuscation and
anonymity can provide protection for an individual’s privacy, over-
generalization may lead to less-valuable data. In this paper, we
contrive generalization boundary techniques (k-anonymity) to max-
imize data usability while minimizing disclosure with a privacy
access control mechanism. This paper proposes a combination of
purpose-based access control models with an anonymity technique
in distributed computing environments for privacy preserving poli-
cies and mechanisms that demonstrate policy conflicting problems.
This combined approach will provide protections for individual per-
sonal information and make data sharable to authorized party with
proper purposes. Here, we have examined data with k-anonymity
to create a specific level of obfuscation that maintains the use-
fulness of data and used a heuristic approach to a privacy access
control framework in which the privacy requirement is to satisfy
the k-anonymity. The extensive experiments on both real-world
and synthetic data sets show that the proposed privacy aware access
control model with k- anonymity is practical and effective. It will
generate an anonymized data set in accordance with the privacy
clearance of a certain request and allow users access at different
privacy levels, fulfilling some set of obligations and addressing pri-
vacy and utility requirements, flexible access control, and improved
data availability, while guaranteeing a certain level of privacy.
KEYWORDS
CPSS, Data privacy and security in CPSS, Access Control, Anonymity
Model.
1 INTRODUCTION
With growing technological advances, Cyber Physical Social Sys-
tems (CPSS) have increasingly been used in automobile, chemical
composition, robotics, and numerous other cloud-based and IoT
applications. CPSS provide many features which enable us to lever-
age the potential of cloud scalability, context relevant experiences,
network-based infrastructures, constructive documentation tools,
and cross platforms, to name a few. The main advantage that CPSS
offers is enabling human input in the loops. It generates a faster
response with a shorter decision time because user- and customer-
generated social data can be used as an unbiased sensor network
for natural experimentation by extracting useful patterns and de-
ploying intelligence to serve the entity to make predictions about
future events and decision making [20]. CPSS can be utilized as a
decision aiding framework and for designing architectural strate-
gies for existing and new applications by tagging based systems or
services where a human remains in the sensing loop or where social
sensing data is a good option to train machine to make decisions
with trained data set and fact-finding algorithms. However, these
enabling technologies, which make the automatic design of CPSS
feasible, also introduce multiple privacy and security challenges
that need to be examined. One of the most important aspects that
has not been researched well is how users’ contributions to the
system are protected from the privacy and security point of views.
Due to the open network structure and service sharing scheme
of the cloud, it imposes very challenging obstacles to security, as
CPSS are relatively sophisticated systems, ranging from integrata-
tion of multiple devices to highly heterogeneous networks and
the possible severity of the physical environment. Therefore, CPSS
are more susceptible to targeted attacks since this system includes
cyberspace, physical space and social space, where the malicious
users can attack from multiple links and sources: for example, the
location data that comes from GPS or the user’s handheld device in
social space or the user’s authentication information in cyberspace.
Malicious attackers may eavesdrop on sensitive information if there
is lack of reasonable security and privacy mechanisms.
One important technique that is often used to protect private
information (static or dynamic) in distributed systems is specifically
tailored to support privacy policies. Securing private information
cannot be easily achieved by traditional access management sys-
tems because traditional access management systems focus on
which user is performing what action on which data object [18],
and privacy policies are concerned with which data object is used
for what purpose(s). When the users will be sharing or searching
their location using apps like Foursquare and Swarm, which shop-
ping mall/ hospitals they are visiting that might expose their data,
including name, age, diseases, current location, and historical loca-
tions. If the privacy and data sharing policy is not defined clearly,
including who will be using the data and for what purpose, then
there will be complexities that might expose their data to unau-
thorized data collectors. Again, for hiding identifiable information,
there are several anonymity and obfuscation techniques that have
been developed by several researchers. However, anonymity is not
enough to accomplish the purpose of CPSS. There is no doubt that
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users may be willing to participate in data aggregation but probably
do not intend to have their private information leaked. For example,
we can get our step numbers on WeChat everyday and share with
our friends to establish a ranking list. However, the data collected
by the cyber devices may contain personal information, which users
may not want to be leaked. How to aggregate data with privacy
preservation therefore has become a critical and challenging issue
that hampers the advancement of data aggregation in CPSS [19].
Through our research, we have worked on how to preserve users’
data privacy and security while maintaining the purpose of CPSS,
which is data aggregation. Our combined approach proposes a com-
prehensive framework for purpose and data management where
purposes are organized in a hierarchy. In our approach each data el-
ement is associated with a set of purposes, as opposed to the single
security level in traditional secure applications. We have combined
the anonymity model to hide the identification information from
unauthorized third-party data collectors or other external users.
In the following section, we will be presenting research work for
preserving privacy in CPSS.
2 RELATEDWORKS
Preserving privacy in the CPSS has been attracting attention from
both academia and industries. Most of the prior research studies
has focused on data privacy and has not considered the usability of
CPSS.
Pitofsky [14] showed that 97 percent of web sites and distributed
systems were collecting at least one type of identifying information
such as name, home address, e-mail address, postal addressws of
consumers, or current or historical locations. The fact that per-
sonal information is collected and can be used without any consent
or awareness violates privacy for many people. Access control
mechanisms for enforcing such policies have not been investigated
[8]. Ni et al. [11] analyzed conditional privacy management with
role-based access control, which supports expressive condition lan-
guages and flexible relations among permission assignments for
complex privacy policies. It is important to note that simply remov-
ing identity information, like names or social-security numbers,
from the released data may not be enough to anonymize the data.
Many examples show that even when such information is removed
from the released data, the remaining data, combined with other
information sources, may still link the information to the individual
[17]. Sweeney [15] proposed approaches based on the notion of
k-anonymity as solutions to the problem. Another secure private
information techniques such as density-based clustering algorithms
happens in the context of data mining [10].
Trust-based security approaches are widely applied in CPSS.
Privacy preservation in CPSSs has become increasingly important
and thus attracts attention from both academic and industrial com-
munities. This issue has drawn even more attention in the recent
years due to pervasive embedded sensors in mobile devices. Privacy
protections are also becoming a significant consideration for both
customers and enterprises in today’s corporate marketing strategies.
This raises challenging questions and problems regarding the use
and protection of private messages, especially for context-aware
web services [4]. One principle of protecting private information
is based on who is allowed to access private information and for
what purpose [1]. For example, personal information provided by
patients to hospitals may only be used for record keeping purposes
not for advertising purposes. So, there must be a purpose for data
collection and data access. The work in [7] proposes trust archi-
tecture for pervasive systems by extending SPKI and role-based
access control. In particular, the framework is enabled based on a
distributed model that employs various security agents to identify
the authentication within their service domain. Additionally, ontol-
ogy is utilized to specify the user’s permission rule, and a delegation
chain is used to deliver the access privilege between multiple users.
In the work of [12], a cyber-physical-social security architecture is
presented for future IoT, it is divided into three layers to protect the
security of IoT, including information security, physical security
and management security. The work in [3] presents a trust-based
personalized privacy model for pervasive environments. It mainly
includes a trust privacy manager and a user-centric privacy frame-
work. A trust privacy manager is a user-centric abstraction in which
the goal is to realize the balance between privacy protection, service
usability and user manageability. Further, a user-centric privacy
framework as a reference framework that not only offers privacy
control but also gives the brokering context to interact with exter-
nal parties. The component of a user-centric privacy framework is
developed by a service- oriented architecture framework. To some
extent, it is expected to enable the loose coupling of the holistic
architecture and to achieve high flexibility for privacy management.
However, while existing security and privacy approaches aim to
address the security of embedded systems, Cyber Physical systems,
and Cyber Social Systems, they are tricky to adapt to the multiple
security requirements of CPSS. Currently there lacks a universal
framework to integrate approaches for CPSS. Here, in our paper
we are demonstrating with mathematical and logical expressions
how to specify and enforce policies for authorizing purpose-based
access management and combining anonymity techniques.
3 PROPOSED PRIVACY ARCHITECTURE
There are two parts of our security architecture to increase the level
of user’s privacy while maintaining the quality of data that can be
shared with authorized data collector to make the CPSS a useful
framework to deal with. Figure 1 shows the design architecture.
Only obfuscation and anonymity can be reasons for hampering
or disregarding the importance of data aggregation from CPSS
that are useful in many ways. Hence, combining access control for
authentication and verification to get information from users will
be helpful for authorized third parties to gain their purpose and
also restrict attackers.
For this use case, we will be considering external user attacks
from three main adversaries who are more likely to want to access,
or are prone to use, the online data or any relational query data.
Addressing three kinds of adversaries at the same time would not
be feasible from the perspective of privacy access control and k-
anonymity mechanism. Yet while the motivation behind external
users’ attacks can be divergent, their approaches are often similar.
They mostly seek to sow disruption misdirect by planting mislead-
ing data or taking down police and government systems. For now,
using a single use case for this research will make the discussion
more effective and we can say this integrated method can serve
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Figure 1: Combined Privacy preserving Model (Access Con-
trol Policy and Anonymity)
the purposes that we have mentioned above to fulfill mainly two
main missions here which are data availability for authorized users
and guarantee a certain amount of privacy access control of the
information shared online or any relational databases by users.
3.1 Anonymity Technique
According to [13] [16] [2] [9], our privacy model could be consis-
tent with the objective that of publishing truthful data against both
reidentification and semantic attacks by satisfying criterions of k−
anonymity, l− iversity and t− closeness. First, k− anonymity en-
sures the attacker cannot distinguish the victim from at least k − 1
other individuals, which is used against reidentification attacks. We
can also say that k-anonymity protects the privacy of individual
persons by pooling their attributes into groups of at least k peo-
ple, assuming the data set has N entries, and each entry includes
attributes Xi (iϵ[0,A]) with information like age, gender, address,
which are quasi identifiers. We are also assuming that the dataset
only includes a single sensitive point of information like disease,
income, or something what usually a person usually wants to pro-
tect. Our method will generalize the dataset with more than one
sensitive data point, while there will be no indication of difference
between quasi-identifier and sensitive information. Since we do not
limit the attacker’s knowledge about individual’s trajectory, the
victim’s trajectory should be indistinguishable from at least k − 1
other trajectories, which means these trajectories should be the
same after generalization.
However, if all the persons in the group of data have the same
sensitive attributes, the adversaries will still be able to learn about
the sensitive attributes. In order to fix this problem, privacy criteri-
ons of l− diversity and t− closeness should be met, which requires
that the sensitive attribute of a k− anonymous set contains at least l
well-represented values for the sensitive attribute. With probabilis-
tic reason, adversaries can still access about a person’s information
where t-closeness is significant. It demands that the statistical distri-
bution of the sensitive attribute values in each k-anonymous group
is "close" to the overall distribution of that attribute in the entire
dataset. Closeness can be measured using e.g. the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence.
Third, in order to maintain the truthfulness of the dataset, we
only use spatiotemporal generalization and suppression to process
the trajectory data. Spatial generalization means merging nearby
base stations, and temporal generalization means increasing tem-
poral granularity to combine different trajectories into one. When
merging some spatiotemporal points causes a huge loss of spa-
tiotemporal granularity, we just delete them, which is called sup-
pression.
Turning a dataset into a anonymous dataset is a difficult problem
and even finding the optimal partition into k-anonymity is NP-Hard.
We have used greedy search technique “Mondrian” to partition the
original data.
Quasi Identifier: pieces of information that are not of them-
selves unique identifiers, but are sufficiently well correlated with
an entity
Sensitive Attribute: Information related to a specific individual
that can cause a privacy breach.
Algorithm 1: Partitioning data to k-anonymous group
Result: Complete Set of Partitions
initialize complete set to empty set, Pcom = 0
Initialize working set of partition to set containing a
partition with entire dataset
Pworkinд = (1, 2, 3, 4, ...n)
while Partition in working set do
pop;
Calculate span(columns in partition);
Sort Resulting columns;
Split with median;
if partition with anonymity then
add new partition;
else
add original partition to complete partitions;
end
end
3.2 Purpose-Based Access Control
This paper bridges the gap between private information protecting
mechanisms and access control models. We propose a purpose-
based access control framework with an anonymity technique.
This section develops the purpose-based access control framework,
which includes extended access control models and supports pur-
pose hierarchy by introducing the intended and access purposes
and purpose associated data models.
The purpose explains the reason(s) for collecting data and ac-
cessing it [5]. If there is a set of purposes P that is organized in a
tree structure, then each node represents a purpose in P and each
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Figure 2: Example of purpose structure (inspired by [5])
edge represents relations between two purposes. Figure 2 shows
the purpose structure tree.
Assuming Pi and Pj be two purposes in the hierarchical pur-
pose tree where Pi is the predecessor of Pj . There remains some
relationship among the purposes based on the tree structure of
purposes. Suppose in the purpose tree, while P is a set of purposes,
PkϵP is a purpose, the predecessor purposes of Pk which is the
set of all nodes that are senior to Pu . On the above tree structure,
Predecessor (Direct Use) = Marketing, G-Purpose in figure 2. The
junior purposes of Pk , is the set of all nodes that are junior to Pk .
For instance, Successor (Admin) = Analyze, Profiling. We have fol-
lowed the research work of [5] to design an access control model
with a stated privacy policy by adding purposes for data objects to
be confirmed if a particular data element is allowed to be shared.
Access purpose authorizations are granted to users based on the
access purpose on the data, obligations and conditions. In order
to perform privacy-preserving access control, a system needs to
enforce privacy requirements stated by data owners.
3.2.1 Definition: According to the basic privacy access control
model, there are a few components in it. Mainly there are three
entities that are used in a basic access control system: subjects, ob-
jects, and operations. Based on the access control model, purposes,
role, policy would be added. A set S of Subjects, a set D of Data, a
set P of purposes, a set A of actions, a set of O for obligations and a
set of C for conditions.
• Set of data access right: (d, a)|a ϵ A, d ϵ D
• Private data access right: (da,a,p,c,o)|daϵ DA,pϵ P,cϵ
C,oϵ O,aϵ A
• Assignment of private data subject: access of private
information.
• Purpose: The reason for access.
For example:
• Subjects:Amazon, eBay, Fedex,Customer − service
• Data:In f oOrder ,ContactInf o,MailinдAdd, EmailAdd
• Action:check,Update,Delete
• Purpose:Order ,Complaint,Billinд, Shippinд, ProblemSolvinд
The following privacy policies:
1. "Amazon can check customers’MailingAdd for shipping purpose".
2. "eBay can only check customers’ EmailAdd for sending further
alert if they allow to do so".
3. "Fedex may check customers’ InfoOrder for Billing purpose and
customers will be informed by Email".
4. "Customer-service can check customers’ ContactInfo for Problem
solving if it is approved by Amazon".
Hence, these policies are expressed as follows in a privacy access
control model: P1: (Amazon, (MailingAdd, check), Shipping, N /A,
ϕ); P2: (eBay, (EmailAdd, check), Purchase, OwnerConsent = ‘Yes’,
ϕ); P3: (Fedex, (InfoOrder, Check), Billing, N/A, Notify(ByEmail));
P4: (customer-service, (ContactInfo, check), Problemsolving, ’Ap-
proved by Amazon’, N/A)
3.2.2 Policy Operation: With the change of technological and reg-
ulatory affairs, new policies need to be added. This section analyzes
the impact of generating new policies to add to an existing pri-
vacy access control model. Sometimes, a new policy for privacy
protection is raised, but it might not be addressed. For example,
when eBay moves to the complaint section, a new policy need to
be addressed.
5. "eBay can only check Email address of customers, for com-
plaint purpose if they are allowed by customers" The corresponding
expression will be reflected in the model:
P5:(eBay,(EmailAdd, check), Complaint, OwnerConsent = ’Yes’, ϕ).
Algorithm 2: Component Checking for access by [6]
Comp-Check1(ap,AIP, PIP)
1. if apϵPIPthen
2. return False;
3. else if apϵAIP ↓ then
4. return True;
5. end if
Comp-Check2(ap, CIP, PIP)
1. if apϵPIPthen
2. return False;
3. else if apϵCIP ↓ then
4. return True;
5. end if
Where, AIP: Allowed Intended Purpose; PIP: Prohibited
Intended Purpose; CIP: Conditional Intended Purpose
Now compared with previous purpose P2, these are two policies
for eBay to access email addresses. There are two different pur-
poses: one for purchase and one for compliant. Now how would the
system verify Complaint to access email addresses within consent
conditions? To make it simpler and for polices to be updated, we
can use a conjunction here for two different purposes. That is, if a
user wants to access right ar on data d for purpose Pu, all access
polices related to ((d,ar ), P) need to be checked. So, in the example
above, eBay can check the email address if there exists at least one
policy (purchase or compliant) that will satisfy all policies. If a new
access policy is related to the same user, same data, same right and
same conditions of some existed private policies, it is not used to
relax the access situations but to make the access stricter. If privacy
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admin wants to ease/modify the access environments, they can do
so by revising the existed access policies instead of creating a new
one. For Policy checking, here we utilized the algorithms by [6].
Finally, the access decision is constructed based on the Comp-Check
and intended purposes of a specific attribute.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We implement a simple algorithm multi-dimensional k-anonymity
to produce a k-anonymous dataset. k-anonymity protects the pri-
vacy of individual persons by pooling their attributes into groups of
at least k people. We explore the "Mondrian" algorithm which uses
a greedy search algorithm to partition the original data into smaller
and smaller groups. (If we plot the resulting partition boundaries in
2D they resemble the pictures by Piet Mondrian, hence the name.)
The algorithm assumes that we have converted all attributes into
numerical or categorical values and that we’re able to measure the
"span" of a given data attribute Xi .
The algorithm proceeds then to partition the data into k-anonymous
groups. After obtaining the partitions, we still need to aggregate the
values of the quasi identifiers and the sensitive attributes in each k-
anonymous group. For this, we can e.g. replace numerical attributes
with their range (e.g. "age: 24-28") and categorical attributes with
their union (e.g. "employment-group: [self-employed, employee,
worker]"), though other aggregations are possible. Methods like
[5] even preserve the micro-data in each group, which increases
re-identification-risk.
We are using text data of Adult with different quasi identifiers
like age, work class, education, marital status, occupation, race,
and age, and also containing sensitive attribute income. For our
implementation purpose, first we have considered two columns
from the dataset to apply partition to speed up the execution. With
that execution, 500 partitions have been created. The results after
creating partitioning functions to divide datasets are below for
better visualization. After partitioning and sorting the resulting
data frame using features columns and sensitive attributes, we have
a k-anonymous dataset with age, count, education and income.
For generating k-anonymous data that contains one row for each
partition and value of sensitive data, we aggregate the columns of
each partition.
We implement l-diversity in order to protect the privacy of the
persons in the dataset even better. The image below cam make it
more understandable.
For t closeness: As we can see, for regions where the value diver-
sity is low, our l-diverse method produces partitions that contain a
very large number of entries for one value of the sensitive attribute
and only one entry for the other value. This is not ideal because
while there is "plausible deniability" for a person in the dataset
(after all the person could be the one "outlier"),an adversary can
still be very certain about the person’s attribute value in that case.
t-closeness solves this problem by making sure that the distribution
of sensitive attribute values in a given partition is similar to the
distribution of the values in the overall dataset. We generate the
global frequencies for the sensitive columns.
In our model, customers are given three more possible options
for using their data. These make them comfortable to release their
data fully or conditionally, knowing the private information will be
Figure 3: anonymous data visualization after partitioning
Figure 4: After Applying I-diversity
protected. After data are collected, intended purposes with three
different levels will be associated with data. As the intended purpose
is assigned to every data element, an intended-purposes table (IPT)
is formed. Data providers (customers) are able to control the release
of their data by adding privacy levels to the IPT which will not
affect data in the database. After authorizing an access purpose,
users get access to purpose permissions from the access control
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Figure 5: After applying t-closeness
engine. The access control engine needs a match process to finish
the compliance computation fully or conditionally in accordance
with access purposes and intended purposes. If the requester’s
access purpose is fully compliant with the intended purposes of
requested data, the engine will release full data to the requester. On
the other hand, if the access purpose is conditionally compliant,
the engine will release conditional data to the requester; otherwise
returned data will be null. Thus, in this model the search engine
needs to evaluate two compliance checks, the first one is for full
compliance and the second one is for conditional compliance.
5 CONCLUSION
From our research, we can conclude that a combined approach
of anonymity and a purpose-based access control policy foster a
privacy preserving environment for personal information. Formu-
lating the interaction between these two mechanisms make the
cyber physical social system more usable and at the same time
preserve a certain level privacy. We have also analyzed the impact
of adding new policies and the conflicts that can result. Algorithms
have been developed to help a system detect and solve these prob-
lems. Furthermore, the experimental results demonstrate the prac-
ticality of the algorithms. The evaluation of the dataset validates
the effectiveness of the algorithm, and the component check for
purpose-based privacy paves the way to a direct, proper policy for
access control. For our future work, we will evaluate more datasets
with this method and extend this model to incremental data.
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